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Cold War Revival:
Neoconservatives and Historical
Memory in the War on Terror
David Hoogland Noon
During the Cold War, Americans made choices in places like 
Berlin and Korea whose implications continued to resonate for 
decades. Now we face decisions of similar weight and conse-
quences in places like Afghanistan and, most of all, Iraq.
—Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, 
The War Over Iraq (2003)1
 Among other things, the so-called “global war on terrorism” will be re-
membered for returning neoconservatism—even if temporarily—to American 
political discourse. As of this writing, dozens of books, several documentary 
films, websites galore, and hundreds of articles in the American press alone 
have explored, bemoaned, celebrated or critiqued the contemporary influence 
of defense policy intellectuals like Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, or Richard 
Perle, think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), or working 
groups like the Project for a New American Century (PNAC).2 From the onset 
of the war against terrorism in 2001, neoconservative contributions to foreign 
policy discourse were highly visible and controversial. Properly or not, the war 
on Iraq will likely be remembered as a neoconservative campaign, in much the 
same way the Spanish-American war is popularly, if erroneously, recalled as the 
ideological gift of the yellow press.
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 As with most intellectual movements, neoconservatism eludes narrow defi-
nition. Not long before her death, Jeane Kirkpatrick, one of the most prominent 
first-generation neoconservatives to emerge from the Reagan administration, 
diagnosed “an almost epidemic use of the term” in contemporary arguments 
about United States foreign policy.3 In everyday usage, the term has acquired 
an incoherent array of meanings, many of which are ahistorical and contradic-
tory—as, for example, when “neoconservative” is used as a synonym for the 
Christian right, or when neoconservatives are described as merely a domestic 
analog to Israel’s Likud Party.4 As one of the primary ideological artifacts of the 
cold war, neoconservatism emerged from arguments over domestic and foreign 
policies that came to crisis during and after the American war in Vietnam. Yet 
neoconservatives were also preoccupied with questions of history and national 
identity. For prominent neoconservatives like Perle and David Frum, Charles 
Krauthammer, William Kristol, Michael Ledeen and others, the onset of the war 
on terrorism drew on a reservoir of collective character that extended back to the 
nation’s founding. Indeed, Ledeen called it a “very old kind of war . . . right out 
of the eighteenth century, the very kind of war that gave us our national iden-
tity.”5 Challenging the idea that war serves merely to defend American interests 
and assure its security, neoconservatives asserted that war actually fleshes out 
national identity and that any successful war would broadcast the United States’ 
political values and cultural norms.
 These beliefs are certainly not without precedent in American history. The 
presumed link between war and national identity, for example, would have been 
familiar to Progressive Era imperialists like Josiah Strong and Theodore Roos-
evelt, and aggressive varieties of American expansionism have been a consistent 
feature of American culture since the nation’s founding.6 Yet neoconservatism, I 
argue, is unique in its obsession with the past as a model for the reconstruction of 
national virtue and for the assertion of American power on a global scale. While 
President George W. Bush himself preferred to invoke images of the “greatest 
generation” when describing the nation’s character and mission during wartime, 
neoconservatives turned instead to the cold war as resource for their historical 
lessons.7 Unlike World War II, which typically summons to mind images of na-
tional unity, popular memories of the cold war evoke a fractious domestic order, 
one in which Americans contended with anti-communist hysteria, countercultural 
revolution, traumatic political realignments and perilous foreign policy choices 
in Vietnam and elsewhere. Reflecting on that past, neoconservatives have em-
phasized a national history marked by clear choices, squandered opportunities, 
and national redemption; they have drawn sharp lines between “freedom” and 
“tyranny” abroad and between patriots and appeasers at home. 
 Here, the crucial question is not whether the cold war actually supplies a 
usable past that might aid the American war against terrorism, nor am I asking 
whether neoconservative versions of cold war history are empirically valid. 
When neoconservatives write or speak of the cold war, they focus almost ex-
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clusively on the contours of American leadership—particularly its rhetorical 
intonations—giving little sense of the social, cultural and political nuances of 
the broader cold war era. Moreover, their approach to the history of the cold war 
is reductive and dramatic. They emphasize presumably self-evident beginnings 
and conclusions, celebrate individual leaders of near-mythic status, and seek to 
portray a moral universe cleaved between the forces of light and dark. In doing 
so, neoconservatives impose historical clarity where others might find ambigu-
ity and contingency. Their nostalgia for the cold war is messianic rather than 
despairing.
 Yet because neconservative intellectuals insist on the meaningfulness of 
history, I am interested in what the cold war clarifies for them. What lessons do 
they claim to draw from it, and how do they invoke a cold war past that suits 
their view of the United States’ mission in the contemporary historical moment? 
While neoconservatism is an intellectually diverse and multigenerational move-
ment in American politics, one of its characteristic features remains a preference 
for using a particular and self-serving configuration of cold war history to inform 
its arguments about the “present danger.” Neoconservatives sought to reanimate 
that tone of struggle—and to vindicate their own counsel—in part by invoking 
the cold war as the most relevant historical guide for comprehending the “present 
danger.” The first section of this essay examines the forms of national identity 
proposed by neoconservative writers during the cold war, taking note of the ways 
that neoconservatives distinguished their foreign policy perspectives (and their 
sense of national-historical mission) from liberal internationalists and realists. 
The second portion of the essay considers neoconservative perspectives on the 
“war on terror,” which they have often depicted as an opportunity to rededicate 
a foreign policy disposition articulated during the Truman administration, aban-
doned by traditional conservatives and liberals and then revived by President 
Ronald Reagan. 
Neoconservatism, the Cold War and Imperial Identity
 As Michael Shapiro has described it, the discourses of foreign relations set 
policy while also embracing “moral geographies”—popularly-held beliefs about 
one’s own nation as well as other regions of the world. Shapiro argues that such 
beliefs become crucial to the intimate, local processes of identity-formation, 
endowing categories like race, class, gender, and nation with meaning, material-
ity, and historical specificity.8 Foreign policy, Melani McAlister writes, is thus a 
“semiotic activity” that assists in the imagination and construction—rather than 
simply the defense or extension—of national identities and interests.9 Over the 
past decade, critics like McAlister, Amy Kaplan, and Matthew Frye Jacobson 
among others have argued for a more sophisticated account of empire and Ameri-
can culture, drawing greater attention to the interaction of material, ideological 
and imaginative registers in the formation of what William Appleman Williams 
once called “empire as a way of life.”10 The culture of American empire—of 
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which neoconservatism is a part—enlivens its subjects by depicting the United 
States as an indispensable beacon for the world’s future progress.
 Neoconservative discourse sprung from various traditions of American 
exceptionalism, including nineteenth-century progressivism and Social Gospel 
theology, as well as the rhetorical traditions of “covenant renewal,” which urges 
followers to adhere faithfully to the national mission or risk the loss of divine 
favor.11 To cite Louis Hartz’ classic formulation, neoconservatives promote an 
“absolute national morality” that obliges its bearers to either flee from or trans-
form an alien world.12 In Walter MacDougall’s more contemporary phrasing, 
neoconservatives are “global meliorists” who believe that the U.S. “can, should, 
and must” bring the world into alignment with its own ideals. This ambition is 
derived from their conviction that “the American model is universally valid, 
that morality enjoins the United States to help others emulate it, and that the 
success of the American experiment itself ultimately depends on other nations 
escaping dearth and oppression.”13 To the degree that neoconservative ideas 
helped reshape the views of many Americans on domestic issues like affirmative 
action and welfare, they also promoted a set of foreign policy beliefs that cast 
the United States as an exceptional yet universal nation, one that led not merely 
by passive example but through virtuous performance. At the core of the neo-
conservative historical vision stand the United States—enduring and perpetually 
imperiled—and its citizens, who face the choice of remaining faithful to their 
national mission or suffering the wrath that bears down upon all apostates. To 
neoconservative writers, the latest war therefore cannot be seen as a deviation 
from national traditions but rather as a reaffirmation of the nation’s foundational, 
evangelical, and embattled identity.
 In one sense, neoconservatives emerged in the late twentieth century as 
the most articulate proponents for a new culture of American empire, the latest 
advocates for manifest destiny. Tracing the course of such ideas as have been 
rededicated from one generation to the next, one is struck by Edward Said’s ob-
servation that a “kind of monotony” sustains the “schemes, phrases, or theories 
produced . . . to justify the serious responsibilities” of the United States as a global 
power.14 Yet not all of these schemes, phrases and theories have been uttered in a 
belligerent tone of voice. In the United States especially, expressions of empire 
have traditionally adopted the soothing tones of liberal universalism, which 
treats foreign policy as the means of extending order and civilization—usually 
defined in terms of economic freedom, republican institutions, and Christian-
ity—to benighted peoples. (The recipients of these gifts cannot be imagined as 
undeserving, though they may prove momentarily ungrateful or unappreciative. In 
due time, however, they will—as the saying goes—welcome us as liberators.) 
  If imperialism, as one historian writes, “lies at the heart of US foreign 
relations,” the cultures of United States imperialism have asserted the nation’s 
military, economic, or political supremacy while eagerly disavowing those same 
“selfish forces” with which imperialism is traditionally associated.15 As Frank 
Ninkovich has persuasively argued, the traditional markers of individual and 
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collective identity were transformed by modernity, which prioritized the role of 
culture in the creation of an interdependent world. As a consequence, beliefs about 
national identity worked their way toward the center of international relations; no 
longer governed primarily by traditional calculations of national interest, material 
gain, or national prestige, the discourses of U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth 
century became preoccupied with narratives about the “civilizing mission” of 
the United States in other parts of the world. Foreign policy, therefore, acquired 
a kind of identity politics of its own, as concerns about national security came 
to be framed by the discourses of culture, by anxieties about the survival of an 
“American way of life” (rather than the survival of America as such) and by the 
conviction that American values, if they are to endure, must be promoted and 
extended globally.16 
 Walter Russell Mead has identified the roots of this broadly “Wilsonian” 
perspective in the work of nineteenth-century American missionaries, whose 
liberal theology emphasized the global expansion of democracy, racial equality 
and human rights.17 While the traditions of Wilsonianism are usually associated 
with the development and expansion of international institutions like the League 
of Nations and the United Nations, Mead reminds us that the core of “Wilsonian” 
thinking has always emphasized the evangelizing purposes of American civili-
zation. Thus Max Boot, who regards himself as a “hard Wilsonian” rather than 
a neoconservative, has argued that Wilsonians promote a balance of morality 
and self-interest in their foreign policy. On his account, Wilson was “one of our 
most interventionist presidents,” deploying force on behalf of liberal democracy 
throughout the world.18 Shades of this belief could be found everywhere in the 
speeches of George W. Bush, especially in his oft-repeated claim that the prin-
ciples of freedom are not owned by a single nation but are instead the destiny 
of all, “the birthright of every person—in every civilization.”19 Accordingly, the 
measure of one’s affection for “American civilization” may be found in one’s 
willingness to promote the extension of its values and principles. Such suppos-
edly neoconservative ideas, as Gideon Rose pointed out a year before George W. 
Bush acquired the presidency, have always enjoyed a certain measure of popular 
charm, offering Americans a sense of providence and purpose. These ideas also, 
Rose warned, have a history of promoting dangerous oversimplifications.20 
 However much it may resonate with these disparate cultural and intellectual 
traditions, neoconservatism is inseparable from the history of the cold war. Unlike 
traditional American conservatives, the first generation of neoconservatives were 
secular modernists who traced their origins to the left wing of the New Deal, to 
post-World War II social science, to the cold war liberalism of Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Nitze, to the political writings of Sidney Hook and James Burnham, and 
to the politics of “muscular liberals” like Truman and Henry “Scoop” Jackson. 
This generation of cold war intellectuals actually began their public lives as 
anti-Stalinist liberals—even Trotskyites in some early cases—who were affili-
ated with the Democratic Party during the 1940s and 1950s. Neoconservatives, 
however, recoiled from the new left during the Vietnam era, frustrated with the 
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rise of black nationalism, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs, and the 
policies of détente pursued by Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter 
toward the Soviet Union, China and the so-called “Third World.” Committed to 
the proposition of American exceptionalism, neoconservatives were united by 
their skepticism toward moral relativism and its alleged denial of the superiority 
of American ideals and values. 
 Presenting their ideas in the pages of eclectic journals such as Commentary 
and The Public Interest during the 1960s and 1970s and through advocacy groups 
like the Committee on the Present Danger, the Committee for the Free World, 
and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, neoconservative influence broad-
ened during the 1980s, ascending to dominance at think tanks like the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institute. 
Additionally, neoconservatives helped create non-governmental organizations 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy, and they established important 
alliances with more traditional conservative institutions such as the John M. Olin 
and Richard Mellon Scaife Foundations. The political migration of neoconserva-
tism parallels this institutional transformation. By President Reagan’s first term 
in office, neoconservatives had completed their migration from the Democratic 
Party to the GOP, where they continue, almost without exception, to reside. Since 
the end of the Reagan era, neoconservatism has found its strongest expression 
in journals like the Weekly Standard, in policy organizations like AEI and the 
Hudson Institute, and in a small but notable clearinghouse known as the Project 
for a New American Century (PNAC), which has become the dominant symbol 
of the neoconservative ascension following September 11, 2001. 
 Broadly speaking, neoconservatism represented one of several competing 
arenas of foreign policy thought within the wider conservative movement from 
the 1970s through the 1990s. It was always reviewed with considerable skepti-
cism by realists, libertarians or populists who may have regarded neoconserva-
tives as interlopers, “right wing liberals,” or—in the caustic words of Patrick 
Buchanan—“boat-people from the McGovern revolution who rafted over to 
the GOP at the end of conservatism’s long march to power.”21 Henry Kissinger, 
recalling the emergence of neoconservatism with some degree of disfavor, wrote 
in 1999 that “tactics bored them; they discerned no worthy goals for American 
foreign policy short of total victory.”22 More recently, Richard Lowry, editor of 
the National Review, claimed that neoconservatives cannot properly be called 
“conservative” at all, as they display “impatience at any reminder that the world is 
not infinitely plastic and that not all problems will break down under the solvent 
of American power.”23 Even less impressed with bellicose visions of America’s 
universal dominion, conservative critics Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke 
describe neoconservatives as Wilsonians with bandoliers, “born of the unlikely 
mating of humanitarian liberalism and brute force.”24 
 The hostility is not surprising. As former radical-turned-neoconservative 
Norman Podhoretz reflected in 1996, neoconservatives sought to shape a unique 
perspective that differed from “the older varieties of American conservatism,” 
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especially what he viewed as its repugnant strains of nativism and isolation-
ism. Unlike traditional conservatives—sometimes dubbed “paleoconserva-
tives”—cold war neoconservatives were not intuitively hostile to the welfare 
state, but instead wanted to set limits on it; they supported the mainstream labor 
movement out of gratitude for its anti-communism; they rejected the policy of 
détente, convinced that the Soviet Union was not a “normal” power that would 
respond to ordinary forms of engagement; they supported Israel as a regional 
surrogate in the struggle against Soviet influence in the Middle East; and they 
were repulsed by the American counterculture and bemoaned the weakening of 
American cultural institutions, to which they ultimately assigned blame for the 
disaster in Vietnam.25 From the start, neoconservatives anchored the identity of 
the United States in its need for a strong military, its moral commitment to the 
spread of democracy everywhere, its near-total responsibility for the interna-
tional order, and its resulting obligation to challenge those who defy American 
values. As Louis Hartz observed, early cold war liberals viewed the new struggle 
against the Soviet Union as an “ideological competition for human loyalty” and 
not merely as a strategic encounter rooted in the traditional calculations of great 
power politics.26 Promoting a foreign policy vision of “crisis internationalism,” 
cold war liberals defended American internationalism as necessary to thwart the 
demise of the global order itself.27 
 Neoconservatives rejected the two dominant foreign policy perspectives 
of their era, viewing liberal internationalism and realism as insufficient to the 
task of defending either national or universal human interests. Unlike liberal 
internationalists, whom the neoconservatives strung to the mast for their uto-
pian, legalistic commitments to diplomacy and their faith in the pacific results 
of economic integration, neoconservatives insisted that America’s “hard power” 
be used freely and without apology or embarrassment. Thus, during the Nixon, 
Carter and Reagan administrations, they agitated against arms control negotiations 
with the Soviet Union, arguing that totalitarian regimes could not be trusted to 
honor such agreements and that the illusion of amity merely allotted the Soviets 
much-needed time to enhance their already substantial threat to the United States. 
And unlike traditional foreign policy realists, whose commitments to “order” and 
“stability” led them to accept the existence of unsavory regimes, neoconservatives 
insisted that democracy was a revolutionary force that could not coexist with evil 
but must instead defeat it. Neoconservatives claimed that traditional realists like 
Hans Morgenthau and Kissinger were too enthralled by questions of “interest” 
and “the balance of power” and were not driven to articulate national ideals and 
abstract principles. Contemporary neoconservatives like Lawrence Kaplan and 
William Kristol have argued that realpolitik had no authentic American precur-
sors, that it derived more from Europeans like Metternich and Bismarck than 
from nineteenth-century American statesmen like John Quincy Adams.28 In 
their view, United States foreign policy has always promoted values above mere 
geopolitical power. Believing that the United States represented humankind’s 
universal interests, cold war neoconservatives concluded that constraints on 
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the exercise of American power—actual or recommended—must be rejected.29 
This sense of obligation was pronounced for neoconservatives throughout the 
final two decades of the cold war, when they decried the alleged influence of 
post-Vietnam “isolationists” on both the left and the right. “To disengage [from 
the world] in the service of a narrow nationalism,” Charles Krauthammer wrote 
in 1985, “is a fine foreign policy for a minor regional power . . . . For America 
today it is a betrayal of its idea of itself.”30
 Similar claims are abundant as well in recent neoconservative writing, abetted 
by George W. Bush administration’s insistence that it is waging a war on behalf 
of democracy and its global extensions. According to Hoover Institute fellow 
and Policy Review editor Tod Lindberg, the moral vision of neoconservatives 
was always rooted in the “raw material” of classical liberalism, in the belief 
that “freedom and equality” are “intrinsically expansionist in character” and 
thus must be defined as “universal goods” rather than the exclusive property 
of Americans. “When the United States promotes and defends its liberalism as 
its own,” Lindberg writes, “it is also promoting and defending the liberalism of 
others, of which liberalism in America is a part.” Underscoring similar remarks 
by George W. Bush, Lindberg reiterates the notion that liberty is “not the sole 
property of Americans, even if the United States has played and continues to play 
a special role in [its] protection and extension. On the contrary, these things in 
principle belong to everyone—albeit, in actuality, not yet.”31 In the United States 
especially, as Lindberg’s words reaffirm, the “special role” of the United States 
has often been expressed in the soothing tones of liberal universalism, which 
regards foreign policy as a tool for enlarging the realm of order and civilization 
to include benighted peoples. Michael Ledeen carried forward this tradition of 
benevolent hegemony in 1996, writing that the United States is the 
embodiment of an idea: the sovereignty of a free people defined 
by a commitment to the rights and obligations embodied in 
the written law rather than by a shared ancestry. Our national 
interests cannot be defined in purely geopolitical terms because 
we seek to advance ideals. Therefore, our foreign policy must 
be ideological—must be designed to advance freedom. Three 
times in this century we and our friends and allies have been 
attacked by the enemies of freedom, and three times we have 
prevailed, because of the incomparable power and creativity 
that only free people, bound together by a common purpose, 
can generate. In these days of multicultural relativism, it is 
unfashionable to state openly what the rest of the world takes 
for granted: the superiority of American civilization.32
 Whereas most forms of nationalism seek to preserve the historical par-
ticularities of a nation, neoconservatives promote what Claes Ryn describes as 
an ideological nationalism committed to “ahistorical, supranational principles 
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that they believe should supplant the traditions of particular societies.”33 “Our 
nationalism,” David Brooks and William Kristol wrote in 1997, “is that of an 
exceptional nation founded on a universal principle, on what Lincoln called ‘an 
abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times.’”34 And applicable, they might 
have added, to all wars.
Restoration
 In the months following the catastrophic attacks in New York and 
Washington, the Bush administration underwent an apparent conversion to 
neoconservatism. To the surprise of nearly everyone, Bush seemed to morph 
from the candidate who once promised a “humble” foreign policy to the 
president who suddenly aimed to rid the world of “evildoers” while committing 
the United States to the political and cultural transformation of the Middle 
East. Public addresses such as Bush’s 2002 State of the Union (the setting for 
his historic “axis of evil” declarations), followed by the June announcement 
of his doctrine of pre-emption, established the broad foundations for this 
grand strategy. While these statements were collectively known as the “Bush 
Doctrine,” it was not Bush himself but Vice President Richard Cheney who 
was directly responsible for the presence of Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, 
Kenneth Adelman, Paula Dobriansky, David Wurmser, Lewis Libby and other 
defense policy intellectuals in the Bush administration. Nearly two dozens of 
these “unipolarists” had received prominent appointments in the departments 
of state and defense, while Cheney’s office, the Defense Policy Board, and 
the Project for a New American Century became centers of neoconservative 
thought. Outside the administration, op-ed columnists like William Kristol (The 
Weekly Standard), Charles Krauthammer (The Washington Post), Eliot Cohen 
(The Wall Street Journal), and Max Boot (The Los Angeles Times) provided 
constant and aggressive support for expanding the war in Afghanistan into and 
beyond Iraq. If the promoters of neoconservative foreign policy in the 1990s 
had seemed “anachronistic” to some observers, the attacks in 2001 offered the 
opportunity to reassert their central claims about the nature of American power 
and its historic mission.35 As Robert Kagan argued, “America did not change 
on September 11. It only became more itself.”36 After September 11, 2001, 
neoconservative writers intensified their argument that the United States, as in 
previous epochs, was again embroiled in an existential conflict whose stakes 
included the very survival of democracy. 
 Among other features, neoconservative discourse was immediately notable 
for its insistence that “Islamo-fascism” represented a threat equal to those 
posed by tyrannies in the twentieth century. Neoconservative intellectuals were 
especially apt to describe the current historical moment as the direct successor 
to the challenges faced by the United States in the second half of the twentieth 
century. “Just as the particular events of the 1940s yielded the broad commitment 
that guided America through the Cold War,” wrote William Kristol and 
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Lawrence Kaplan, “so have September 11 and the threat from Iraq combined to 
produce a national security doctrine that responds to the broader dangers of the 
new century.”37 As such, there was nothing particularly unique—and certainly 
nothing discontinuous or revolutionary—about the foreign policy ideas set forth 
under the banner of “democratic globalism,” “American internationalism,” 
“hard Wilsonianism” or any of the other synonyms for neoconservative ideas. 
For writers like Michael Ledeen, therefore, it was not neoconservatism but the 
United States itself that embodied the spirit of revolution; neoconservative ideas 
were merely the expression of that “eternal” revolutionary essence. “We are the 
only truly revolutionary country on earth,” Ledeen explained, “which is both 
the reason for which we were attacked in the first place and the reason we will 
successfully transform the lives of hundreds of millions of people throughout 
the Middle East.”38 
 While focusing practical attention on U.S. policies toward individual states 
like Iraq, Iran or Syria, neoconservatives also participated in the construction 
of a much more elaborate narrative about the war on terrorism, casting it as 
an ideological scrum between Western liberal democracy—alleged to be the 
only viable form of human existence after the cold war—and an insufficiently 
modernized Islamic world spellbound by a fanatical ideology. Charles 
Krauthammer, in a typical formulation, wrote that September 11 reminded 
Americans that the “existential struggles of the past six decades” were alive, 
that “history had not ended.” Instead, “we found ourselves in a new existential 
struggle, this time with an enemy even more fanatical, fatalistic, and indeed 
undeterrable than in the past.”39 This configuration of national identity and 
danger represented one of the primary attributes of neoconservative historical 
discourse, and it bore no small resemblance to the emphasis early cold warriors 
like John Foster Dulles placed on the allegedly expansive nature of Soviet 
ideology. Rather than focusing solely on actual Soviet capabilities, Dulles and 
others claimed that Soviet beliefs (and the intentions that flowed from them) 
should be the root concern of United States policy; thus, any war that sought 
the mere containment of Soviet capabilities would fail to appreciate the deeper 
ideological nature of the struggle.40 As a consequence, cold war was frequently 
depicted in cultural rather than geopolitical terms, as the United States was seen 
as threatened not by an actual attack so much as by an ideology wholly distinct 
from its own cherished principles.41 
 In similar ways, those who wrote in a neoconservative idiom during the 
first few years after the 9/11 attacks gave extraordinary consideration to the 
intentions of “Islamists,” doubtless in part because such intentions could be 
presented as clear and unified across national and organizational lines. As cold 
war hawks believed that they were mobilizing against a communist monolith, 
neoconservatives downplayed the significance of divisions within Islamic 
theology, between one “terror state” and another, or between one terrorist 
organization and the next. Yet while the cold war with the Soviet Union could 
be framed both abstractly (as a continuation of a more general war against 
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totalitarianism that began during the 1940s) as well as concretely (in the 
materiality of the Kremlin, in the doctrines of the Soviet state), no such clarity 
defined the campaign against terrorism, which has been characterized from 
the start by a lack of specificity. In place of concrete national enemies, writers 
like Ledeen chose instead to portray the war in Orientalist terms as a battle of 
identities rather than a clash of states, as a contest between Western civilization 
and an amorphous sump of “Muslim rage.” In The War Against the Terror 
Masters (2003), Ledeen insisted that the Islamists’ “fanatical desire to destroy 
the West grows out of a deep-seated Muslim rage, and is buttressed by a powerful 
Muslim doctrine.” This rage and its doctrine sustained “a global Islamic terror 
network, resting on an Islamic fundamentalist mass movement.”42 
 As David Frum and Richard Perle argued, this radical, insensate “strain” 
of Islam needed to be acknowledged as the most recent successor to the great 
ideological movements of the twentieth century, the latest threat to the United 
States’ identity. That is, it 
seeks to overthrow our civilization and remake the nations of 
the West into Islamic societies, imposing on the whole world 
its religion and its law. . . . Like communism, this ideology 
perverts the language of justice and equality to justify oppres-
sion and murder. Like Nazism, it exploits the injured pride 
of once-mighty nations. Like both communism and Nazism, 
militant Islam is opportunistic—it works willingly with all 
manner of unlikely allies, as the communists and Nazis worked 
with each other against the democratic West.43
Frum and Perle contended further than the relationships between militant Islam, 
Nazism and communism are not merely analogical but genealogical as well. After 
siding with Germany during World War II, they argued, Muslim “xenophobes 
and fanatics” turned to the Soviet Union for inspiration and aid during the 
cold war, producing “socialist republics” in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Algeria. 
“Revolutionary Marxism,” they explained, “offered hope that Arabs could 
obtain the benefits of modernity without the humiliation of Westernization,” 
conjuring up “a seductive vision of progress without compromise with the 
wealthy West.” After the fall of the Soviet Union, Arab economies stagnated 
while the United States commenced a period of economic and technological 
growth that demonstrated to the world that no viable historical alternatives 
existed to Western progress. Rejecting this vision of progress, Osama bin Laden 
and his followers turned instead to “Islam as an ideology,” the latest expression 
of Middle Eastern extremism, heir to the fascists, communists and pan-Arabists 
who had previously made war against the West.44 
 As they revive cold war notions about the global indispensability of the 
United States (and the global perils created by its enemies), neoconservatives 
stressed the ideological dimensions of the current struggle and routinely argued 
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that Americans must name their foe precisely, that the war should be conceived 
as one waged not against the tactic of “terrorism” but against the ideology of 
“militant Islam,” “Islamism” or “Islamo-fascism.” The discursive surreality of 
the war perhaps reached a peak in late July 2005, when a brief controversy 
erupted within the Bush administration over the question of whether the United 
States was waging a “war against terrorism” or a “global struggle against 
violent extremism.”45 To neoconservatives, neither of these terms would 
suffice, primarily because they failed to suggest the ideological magnitude 
of the struggle. Eliot Cohen and Norman Podhoretz, for instance, referred to 
the conflict as “World War IV” to emphasize that the conflict is global and 
that it has “ideological roots.” In February 2002, Podhoretz predicted that this 
war, like all “big wars,” would “end with the world being reshaped in forms 
unanticipated when they begin.”46 Such language suggested not only that the 
war was a campaign against beliefs rather than tactics—and that those beliefs 
were promoted by a coherent alliance of organizations and states—but also that 
they led logically to the conclusion that the aims of the United States needed to 
include the replacement of malignant cultural values by ones more suited to the 
fulfillment of humanity’s universal interests. As Ledeen explained
The radical transformation of several Middle Eastern countries 
from oppressive tyrannies to freer societies is entirely in 
keeping with American character and the American tradition. 
Creative destruction is our middle name, both without our 
own society and abroad. We tear down the old order every 
day, from business to science, literature, art, architecture and 
cinema to politics and law. Our enemies have always hated 
this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces 
their traditions (whatever they may be) and shames them for 
their inability to keep pace. Seeing America undo traditional 
societies, they fear us, for they do not wish to be undone. 
They cannot feel secure so long as we are there, for our very 
existence—our existence, not our policies—threatens their 
legitimacy. They must attack in order to survive, just as we 
must destroy them to advance our historic mission.47
 Ledeen wrote that the messianic vision of the “terror masters” would fail 
just as predictably as the Soviet vision. Radical Islam, he explained, “is to this 
war what communism was to the Cold War. Like the Soviet Union, the terror 
states were both believers in a revolutionary doctrine and commanders of armies. 
Like the Soviets, the radical Islamists believe they have found the key to getting 
on the right side of history.” The vision of radical Islamists, he wrote, depended 
upon continuous success. Once they were shown to be “losers,” they would be 
“rejected by their former and would-be followers . . . . As they begin to lose, 
their people will turn on them, for most of their people are neither crazy nor 
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stupid.”48 Podhoretz likewise insisted on the inevitability of the United States as 
an evangelical power, citing the record of World War II (with its transformations 
of Japan and Germany) and “World War III” (with its reinvention of the “old 
heartland of the evil empire”) as a prelude to the future transformation of the 
Islamic world, which could not “eternally remain an exception” to the advance 
of democracy and capitalism. No matter the “exact contours” of the change, 
“the Islamic countries in particular, and the world in general, will look very 
different by the time this war is over. Very different, and very much better for 
the vast majority of people everywhere.”49
 Ledeen and Podhoretz were not alone in modeling their vision for the future 
on the United States’ transformative mission during and after World War II. In 
the archives of neoconservative historical memory, the early years of the cold 
war are afforded a special place as a time when American leadership awoke to 
its global responsibilities before losing its grip on history. Lawrence Kaplan and 
William Kristol, writing just prior to the Iraq War, insisted that American leaders 
decided in 1943 and 1944 (“well before the Soviet Union had emerged as the 
great challenge to American security and American principles”) that the role of 
the United States in the world was quite simply to “deter aggression globally, 
whoever the aggressor might be, in order to build a safer world.”50 Consequently, 
they argued—reviving one of the major neoconservative themes of the 1990s—it 
was an error to assume that the disappearance of the Soviet Union marked the 
end of this exceptional, expansionist period of U.S. foreign policy. As Robert 
Kagan claimed in Of Paradise and Power, the end of the cold war “was taken by 
Americans as an opportunity not to retract but to expand their reach,” to expand 
its alliances, “to stake out its interests in parts of the world, like Central Asia, 
that most Americans never knew existed before.”51 Having failed to pursue this 
expansive vision, the United States reaped the bitter harvest. Saul Singer, editorial 
page editor of the Jerusalem Post, explained in 2002 that the post-cold war “new 
world” had been “defined more by the absence of Soviet expansionism than by 
an American evangelism for democracy. The result of this complacency, it was 
belatedly discovered, was a new menace—militant Islam —[that was] tempted 
to challenge the hegemony of the free world.”52 
 Over the years, one of neoconservatism’s chief narrative elements has been 
its emphasis on the faltering “credibility” of a nation unwilling to sustain the 
posture appropriate to an indispensable, universal power. As they recoiled from 
the Democratic Party of George McGovern and Jimmy Carter in the 1970s, the 
first generation of neoconservatives envisioned themselves as torch-carriers 
for a version of cold war liberalism they believed to be crystallized in the mes-
sianic words of the Truman Doctrine or in the classified, apocalyptic national 
security sermon that came to be known as NSC-68. Although most contempo-
rary neoconservatives were too young to have experienced this transformation 
personally, they inherited the traditional neoconservative view that the global 
vision of the early cold war liberals had been abandoned in the pursuit of mere 
containment of and coexistence with tyranny. While second-generation neo-
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conservatives typically reached their political maturity during and after Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency—“when conservatism was cool,” Max Boot recalls—they 
often reflect favorably on Truman, Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Paul Nitze 
and other “muscular liberals” of the early cold war, if for no other reason than 
to deride contemporary liberals by comparison.53 David Brooks, a former editor 
of the neoconservative Weekly Standard, wrote during the 2004 campaign that 
these were “Democrats Americans trusted,” the ones who “lived in the shadow of 
World War II.” They saw America engaged in a titanic struggle against tyranny 
and believed in using military means for idealistic ends.”54 As neoconservatism 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s, its proponents were animated by a sense 
that Americans had deviated from an aggressive path laid out during the Tru-
man administration. The Truman Doctrine especially struck neoconservatives 
as a landmark declaration that effectively Americanized the entire project of 
internationalism. Contrasted with the hazy and legalistic mandate of the United 
Nations, the Truman Doctrine acknowledged that the nation’s refusal to act in 
regions outside its narrow spheres of national interest would bring about disas-
trous global consequences.  
 Significantly, many neoconservatives referred to the contest with the Soviets 
as “World War III,” underscoring what they believed to be the continuous nature 
of democratic struggle. As the central force in that struggle, the United States was 
obliged to remain mobilized for a conflict whose terrain extended throughout the 
world. In his 1979 memoir Breaking Ranks, Norman Podhoretz insisted that only 
the first phase of the cold war was worthy of emulation, that the “New Politics” 
of the 1960s had introduced an “anti-growth” doctrine that rejected the extension 
of capitalism and democracy—and by necessity invited the expansion of Soviet 
power. In his view, with the brief exception of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural 
vow to “pay any price, bear any burden” in defense of liberty, American foreign 
policymakers, deriving the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War, had come to 
disavow an aggressive anti-Soviet and pro-American consensus, forgetting the 
cold war’s global dimensions and its resemblance to the previous struggle against 
fascism. Recalling the formation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority in 
1972, Podhoretz observed that disaffected Democrats like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ben 
Wattenberg, and Max Kampelman advocated “the liberal tradition as embodied 
in the Democratic party of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson.” Draw-
ing on that tradition, the CDM “believed that the United States should continue 
to play an active role in the defense of freedom throughout the world, and we 
supported maintaining the military capability required by such a role.”55 
 Not surprisingly, twenty-first-century neoconservatives revived this argu-
ment, contextualizing the war on terror as the next phase in a war for democratic 
expansion that began in earnest after the second world war. In doing so, sup-
porters of George W. Bush frequently enlisted desirable, bipartisan ancestors 
to vindicate contemporary policies (however much the broader landscape of 
Republican policy deviates from the substance of cold war liberalism). Adopting 
the “consensus liberalism” of the early cold war years as the gold standard for 
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foreign policy virtue, neoconservatives like Kaplan and Kristol depicted the Bush 
administration as the true heirs of a broad national faith and not, as critics would 
perhaps have suggested, as the promoters of a narrow ideological agenda. Bush’s 
controversial doctrine of pre-emption, for instance, was frequently measured 
favorably against the audacity of the 1947 Truman Doctrine, whose rhetorical 
commitments included the promise to mobilize the bottomless resources of the 
United States to the worldwide struggle against tyranny.56 Elsewhere, celebrants 
noted the similarities between George W. Bush’s second inaugural address and 
John F. Kennedy’s first, or between NSC-68 and the Bush administration 2002 
document on national security strategy. Jeff Jacoby, conservative columnist for 
The Boston Globe, was so moved by these comparisons that he concluded in 
the summer of 2004 that George W. Bush was “the real Democrat” in the race 
to the Oval Office, that his “explicit policy of advancing democracy” placed 
him in a line of succession that included not only Ronald Reagan but Truman 
and Kennedy as well.57 As Kaplan and Kristol wrote in The War Over Iraq 
(2003)—constructing an argument that resonated with Podhoretz’ recollection 
of the formation of the CDM—the apogee of “American internationalism” oc-
curred during the Truman administration. This version of internationalism, they 
regretted, lost favor after 1968, at which point “liberals and conservatives alike 
abandoned the foreign policy tenets that had guided American through the first 
phase of the Cold War.” This capitulation left only a “small group of Democrats 
and Republicans” to defend the faith, patiently awaiting a presidency dedicated 
to the redemption of those goals.58 
 This ecumenical history, however, served as a preface to a narrative of 
Republican triumphalism. Because neoconservatives were no longer affiliated 
with the Democratic Party after the 1980s, their historical analogies could simply 
end with Truman or Kennedy, who in any event did not survive to witness the 
redemption of their ideals. If neoconservatives claimed that the ideals of cold 
war liberalism were expressed and abandoned by Democrats, they unanimously 
insisted that the apotheosis of neoconservatism (the alleged inheritor of those 
ideals) came during the 1980s under Ronald Reagan, who presided over a Re-
publican administration that committed itself, in rhetoric if not always in policy, 
to nearly everything the neoconservatives had been urging since the mid-1970s. 
If neoconservatives condemned American leadership under Johnson, Nixon and 
Carter for the “betrayal” of the national covenant, they canonized the presidency 
of Ronald Reagan for reviving the winning strategy. Reagan vowed not to con-
tain communism but to transcend it, and his policy of “rollback” refocused the 
nation’s attention on democratizing “peripheral” regions of the world that had 
been abandoned to the Soviets after the disaster in Vietnam. Reagan, who had 
campaigned as a Democrat for Harry Truman in 1948, did not follow the same 
political trajectory as the neoconservatives, switching party affiliation in 1962 
as an early participant in the rise of the Goldwater Right. Nevertheless, neocon-
servatives welcomed him as one of their own. As hagiographer Peter Schweitzer 
has written, Reagan was interested in the “metaphysics” of the cold war rather 
90  David Hoogland Noon
than its strategic minutia, and his personal “epic” was defined by a sense that the 
United States was involved in a “titanic struggle between good and evil.” Like 
the hedgehog in Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay, Reagan knew “one big thing.”59
 Under Reagan, defense budgets bloomed, the final confrontation with com-
munism commenced, the United Nations was spurned and scolded, and the Great 
Society was rebuked. Important neoconservative voices such as Eliot Abrams, 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Eugene Rostow and Richard Perle accepted positions within 
the new administration, and Reagan’s willingness to place the anti-Soviet struggle 
at the center of United States foreign policy seemed a welcome relief to neo-
conservatives who had spent much of their time arguing that “engagement” was 
nothing less than a geopolitical rationalization for appeasement.60 Throughout the 
1980s, neoconservatives argued that Soviet military power equaled or surpassed 
the American arsenal; that the anti-nuclear movement in the United States and 
Western Europe had no equivalent among Soviet citizens; that deterrence was an 
unhealthy fantasy that overlooked the potential usefulness of nuclear weapons 
as an offensive force; and that any sign of weakness, whether in Latin America, 
Northeast Asia or the Middle East, could prove fatal to the United States.61
 Although the political history of the Reagan administration is complex, 
and while it is clear that moderates and conservative nationalists rather than 
neoconservatives came to define the nation’s foreign policy during the 1980s, 
neoconservatives subsequently encased the Reagan presidency in amber. By the 
late 1990s, Kristol and others began to argue that only a “neo-Reaganite”—and 
by extension a “neo-Trumanite”—foreign policy could successfully guide the 
nation into a new millennium. Emphasizing unilateral Reagan-era military in-
terventions in Grenada, Libya, and Central America, neoconservative memories 
of Reagan also celebrate his “belief in the power of American values and ideals” 
and his willingness to use democracy as an “offensive weapon” at the end of 
the cold war.62 In The War Over Iraq, Lawrence Kaplan and Kristol insisted that 
Reagan was no mere conservative realist focused narrowly on interests and power. 
Rather, he embraced a larger vision of American history, finding “no contradic-
tion between the assertion of American power and American ideals.”63 
 The routine and oversimplified claim that Reagan’s administration was 
thoroughly or even preponderantly “neoconservative” became an important 
component to the ubiquitous claim that the Bush administration revived Reagan’s 
(or Truman’s) foreign policy principles.64 Norman Podhoretz, reflecting on the 
similarities between George W. Bush and Reagan, found abundant room for 
comparison in late 2002, a year after the terrorist attacks. With the Taliban seem-
ingly routed from power in Afghanistan and with the administration organizing its 
justifications for war in Iraq, Podhoretz celebrated George W. Bush for “following 
in Ronald Reagan’s footsteps.” As Podhoretz noted, both Reagan and Bush were 
dismissed by various domestic elites as inarticulate simpletons during their runs 
for the presidency, and both were widely viewed by bemused international audi-
ences as reckless cowboys who “by some freak of democratic perversity landed 
in the White House.” In the face of such dismissals, Podhoretz observed, both 
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Reagan and Bush presided over a nation they sincerely believed to be inherently 
righteous and good. Moreover, they did so at moments of great danger and—at 
least for Bush—at a time when the power of the United States was unrivaled, 
“greater than anything recorded in human history.” Both presidents, Podhoretz 
concluded, had risen to the challenge. “What Communism had been to Reagan in 
that war,” he wrote, “terrorism was to Bush in this one; and as Reagan had been 
persuaded that the United States of America had a mission to hasten the demise 
of the one, Bush believed we had a mission to rid the world of the other.” Like 
many neoconservative writers, Podhoretz was especially pleased by the rhetorical 
commitments expressed in Bush’s landmark speeches, including his September 
20, 2001 speech to Congress and the 2002 State of the Union address. Even if the 
fit between presidential rhetoric and policy was not always smooth, Podhoretz 
observed that words “exert an impact all by themselves.” Reagan’s deeds “were 
not always in perfect harmony with his words,” falling short of their promises 
and sometimes even contradicting stated policies. “But as we have discovered 
from former dissidents throughout the ‘evil empire’ of cursed memory, those 
words had a power of their own that enhanced immeasurably the weight of the 
missiles behind them.65
 Analogies between the Bush and Reagan Doctrines, or between Bush’s 
foreign policy and Truman’s, served not merely to sanctify the war but also to 
condemn its skeptics. As Kaplan and Kristol argued, “The Bush national security 
strategy bears little resemblance to strategy documents produced by the Clinton 
administration or, for that matter, by Bush’s father. Harry Truman or Ronald 
Reagan, on the other hand, would have found this robust approach to the in-
ternational scene familiar.” Indeed, on their view “the Bush Doctrine signals a 
return to [an] earlier era, when Munich, not Vietnam, was the cautionary lesson 
and admonitions about the ‘arrogance of power’. . . had little traction among 
U.S. policymakers.”66 If Truman and Reagan were conceived as the alpha and 
omega of cold war foreign policy, neoconservative historical narratives included 
an array of villains and false prophets whose contributions to the struggle have 
been unwittingly detrimental, if not actively hostile, to the benevolent mission 
of the United States. This indictment included the usual suspects—media profes-
sionals, university professors, lawyers and the like—but extended as well to the 
foreign policy discourses whose errors were presumably revealed by the history 
of the cold war. On this view, the direction of U.S. foreign policy since 1989 
had been nothing more than a “holiday from history” devoted to “commerce and 
globalization” among other unfulfilling projects, distracting the nation’s attention 
from the fact that a new existential threat had already declared war on the United 
States.67 
 Not unexpectedly, Bill Clinton’s presidency represented a malignant inver-
sion of everything neoconservatives believe the United States should represent. 
Having already taken Clinton to the woodshed throughout the 1990s, neocon-
servative intellectuals like Krauthammer and Kristol had merely to update their 
earlier critiques, this time with the additional conviction that the foreign policy 
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“drift” of the 1990s had weakened the nation both morally and strategically, lay-
ing the foundation for the 2001 attacks. “When Mr. Clinton’s focus did wander 
abroad,” wrote Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, “the result was a world 
view that reduced a complex and dangerous world environment to a simple nar-
rative of material progress and moral improvement.”68 In The War Over Iraq, 
Kaplan and Kristol ridiculed the “wishful liberalism” of Clinton, observing that 
“Clintonism” looked to international institutions as the only source of legitimacy. 
Seeking “arms control agreements, international treaties, and an aversion to the 
use of force,” the Clinton years thus produced a “quixotic and legalistic” policy 
that accelerated rather than resolved international disorder. By refusing to act 
forcefully in Bosnia, by coddling China, North Korea and Iran, by refusing to 
confront Iraq with anything more than ineffective missile strikes, and by refus-
ing to challenge U.N. members and allies who flouted sanctions on Iraq, Clinton 
revived a “strain of liberalism” that had been “kept in check during the first 
two decades of the Cold War by the dominance of muscular liberals like Harry 
Truman and John F. Kennedy, who harbored no illusions about the perils that 
existed beyond America’s shores.”69 Charles Krauthammer similarly described 
the Clinton years as “a waste, eight years of sleepwalking, of the absurd pursuit 
of one treaty more useless than the last, while the rising threat—Islamic terror-
ism—was treated as a problem of law enforcement.”70 Most disconcerting to 
writers like Krauthammer and Kristol was the suggestion—which they believed 
to be implicit in “Clintonism”—that America’s global power was somehow in 
decline, or (worse) that it should be subjected to self-restraint through multilateral 
institutions that could not possibly serve America’s national interest. To Kaplan 
and Kristol, Clinton had raised the dead, reanimating the “reflexive suspicion 
of American power that had plagued the Democratic Party after Vietnam.”71 
This unconscionably “declinist” perspective, Norman Podhoretz explained, 
had produced historically familiar results. As the Ayatollah Khomeini had been 
encouraged “by the decline of American power in the 1970s” to seize American 
hostages and humiliate an entire nation, “so the ineffectual policy toward ter-
rorism” during the 1990s had convinced Osama Bin Laden that he could “strike 
us massively on our own soil and get away with it.”72
 Dwelling selectively on the foreign-policy history of the cold war—espe-
cially its beginnings and conclusion—post-9/11 neoconservatives insisted that 
the 1990s replicated in miniature fashion the deeper foreign-policy problems of 
the entire cold war. Elsewhere, neoconservatives restaged the intra-conservative 
foreign policy wars of the 1970s, chastising unreconstructed realists for refusing 
to endorse the virtues of  “democratic globalism” and for offering counsel that 
bore an unpleasant resemblance to “détente” and “appeasement.” Brent Scow-
croft, former national security adviser to George H.W. Bush, became a symbol 
for this allegedly “soft-line” approach when he publicly advised against an attack 
on Iraq in August 2002. Explaining Saddam Hussein’s motives in the language 
of traditional realism, Scowcroft insisted that Saddam was a “power-hungry sur-
vivor” with “regional ambitions” that gave him few “incentives” to ally himself 
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with those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. 
He warned that a military campaign against Iraq could prove to be an expensive 
distraction from the war on terrorism, producing a “large-scale, long-term mili-
tary occupation,” threatening “stability” and “security” in a “vital region of the 
world.” Scowcroft urged the Bush administration not to make war unilaterally, 
to press instead for renewed inspections led by the United Nations.73  
 In the weeks that followed, Scowcroft earned respectful criticism in some 
conservative quarters while being practically hung in effigy elsewhere. The Wall 
Street Journal, which published Scowcroft’s original essay, noted in a house edi-
torial that while his version of realism represented “a legitimate point of view” 
with a distinguished tradition in the Republican Party, its recent history did not 
“inspire confidence.” The Journal recalled that Scowcroft had once advised 
against the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in 1991 had urged President Bush 
to leave Saddam Hussein in power. By contrast, the administration of George 
W. Bush was clearly uninspired by the realist pleas for stability and had chosen 
instead to commit his presidency to a “Reaganite” policy of democracy promo-
tion. Scowcroft, the Journal implied, was guilty merely of offering antiquated 
counsel.74 Other conservatives were somewhat less forgiving. In The Weekly 
Standard, William Kristol described Scowcroft as one of the chief figures in an 
“axis of appeasement,” a group of conservatives who “hate the idea of a morally 
grounded foreign policy that seeks aggressively and unapologetically to advance 
American principles around the world.”75 Michael Kelly of The Washington 
Post—who would eventually become one of the first American journalists to die 
in the Iraq War—derided Scowcroft and others as “true isolationists,” offering 
“tut-tuts” and “singing nonsense loudly.”76 Rounding out the neoconservative 
critique, Krauthammer diagnosed Scowcroft, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, 
former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and others as “deterrence 
nostalgics” who urged the United States to pursue a policy of “containment” that 
was no longer necessary in a unipolar world. Emphasizing the practical costs 
of “realism,” Krauthammer insisted that Cold War cautions were a function of 
unique historical circumstances. “At least during the Cold War,” Krauthammer 
wrote in The Weekly Standard, “one could justify deterrence on the grounds that 
there was simply no other choice.” Because the Soviets “could not be disarmed” 
and because a policy of preemption “would have required a surprise American 
nuclear attack,” the United States accepted decades of deterrent policies that 
kept the nation “closer to the abyss than any event in human history.” Unlike 
the Soviets, however, Iraq could be disarmed swiftly. Thus, a renewed policy of 
deterrence would amount to an immoral refusal on the part of the United States 
to challenge a dangerous (and vulnerable) regime, with one consequence being 
the unchecked proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.77 
 After 2001, neoconservative criticism of the unreconstructed “realists” re-
capitulated many of their arguments from the 1970s, in some of the same ways 
that their critiques of liberal internationalism dredged up hostile memories of 
Carter’s “declinist” views of American power after Vietnam. Indeed, it became 
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an article of faith among neoconservatives that the 1970s and the 1990s bore 
considerable resemblance to one another as decades in which realists (Nixon, 
Ford and George H. W. Bush) and liberal internationalists (Carter and Clinton) 
advanced delusional policies that prolonged confrontations that might well have 
been ended, had only a less accommodating course of action been chosen. The 
incapacity of realists to appreciate their policy errors led to renewed accusations 
of “appeasement,” accompanied by reminders that their views were historically 
deviant. In early 2004 David Frum and Richard Perle, for instance, castigated 
the “soft-line ideologues”—including Scowcroft as well as former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage—for trust-
ing “institutions and tactics that have consistently failed in the past. . . . In their 
devotion to the U.N., their belief in the efficacy of international law, and their 
nostalgia for the alliances of the Cold War (and Gulf War I), the soft-liners cling 
to exploded illusions about the way the world should work.”78 On this account, 
the “soft-liners” in the Republican ranks had become virtually indistinguishable 
from the liberal internationalists of yesteryear, wringing their hands over prob-
lems of “stability” and the maintenance of “alliances;” at the same time, liberal 
internationalists, having watched the Bush administration adopt and improve 
upon their own idealism, were left with no other means of opposition than to 
suddenly discover the antiquated language of “deterrence,” “containment,” and 
“prudence.”
 Among others, Charles Krauthammer, William Kristol and Lawrence 
Kaplan argued that the ascent of neoconservative ideas merely represented 
the latest foreign-policy “turn,” assuming a position previously occupied by 
the failed “soft-line” ideologies of liberal internationalism and realism, the 
two “mutually reinforcing barriers to the exercise of American power.”79 For 
Krauthammer, the Bush Doctrine marked “neoconservatism’s own transition 
from a position of dissidence . . . to a position of governance.”80 Following 
the lead of Podhoretz, others writers simply argued that “neoconservatism” 
became indistinguishable from “conservatism” itself in the foreign policy arena. 
Traditional “Fortress America” conservatives like Patrick Buchanan, realists 
like Brent Scowcroft, or libertarians at the Cato Institute were swiftly dismissed 
as obstructionist relics who had not adjusted their views of the world to comport 
with the realities of American power in a unipolar world. With rival factions 
thus no longer relevant, Krauthammer believed, neoconservatism had ceased to 
live as a distinct phenomenon, “converging” with other forms of conservative 
thinking. At the same time, Krauthammer and others viewed the policies of the 
Bush administration as having “converged” once again with the irrepressible 
doctrines of Truman and Reagan, marking a glorious restoration of foreign-
policy views that placed no part of the world beyond the reach of the United 
States and its democratic pursuits. As Podhoretz insisted, the contemporary 
struggle would no doubt prove difficult. “World War IV” had produced an 
enemy “even more elusive than the Communists,” and Americans would need 
“to summon at least as much perseverance as the American people of those days 
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did. . . . Indeed, in this area the generation of World War IV has an even more 
difficult row to hoe than its predecessors in World War II and World War III.” 
Yet as Podhoretz explained further, if the United States proved successful in the 
“spread of liberty,” it would “bring greater security and prosperity not only to 
the people of this country, and not only to the people of the greater Middle East, 
but also to the people of Europe and beyond, in spite of the sorry fact that so 
many of them do not wish to know it yet.”81
Conclusion
 Over the course of four decades, neoconservatives have envisioned the United 
States as an impossibly virtuous nation facing perpetual siege from abroad as well 
as from within. For neoconservatives past and present who either cut their teeth 
during the cold war or reached political maturity at the moment of its conclu-
sion, the 40-year contest with the Soviet Union represents a period during which 
a victorious strain of American foreign policy was immediately and forcefully 
articulated at the close of World War II. In the years that followed, those confron-
tational policies wavered in the face of  “realist” and “liberal internationalist” 
apostasy but were renewed by Ronald Reagan, who carried them aloft to their 
triumphant conclusion. This linear, moralistic and dramatically oversimplified 
narrative nonetheless plays an important part in framing what neoconservative 
intellectuals believe to be the appropriate conditions for winning the war against 
the “terror masters.” Arguing that the history of the cold war shows that Ameri-
cans are capable of restoring abandoned paths to victory, neoconservatives like 
Michael Ledeen nevertheless urge their readers to avoid the “loss of nerve” that 
characterized the middle decades of the cold war. Furthermore, they claim that the 
“lessons” of the cold war must be revived, arguing that American leaders—hav-
ing lost their focus during the first decade after the end of the cold war—must 
reflect once more upon the follies of realism and liberal internationalism. For 
contemporary neoconservatives, the conclusions are self-evident: an aggressive 
foreign policy that promotes the spread of America’s central values represents 
the only legitimate path to winning the war in terror and preserving American 
identity.
 Amid the ubiquitous, clichéd insistence that Americans regard September 
11, 2001 as a “break” from the past, a threshold beyond which nothing would 
ever be the same, neoconservatives have offered a somewhat different narrative 
about the continuities and discontinuities of recent history. The historical gloss 
that appears in recent neoconservative writing encourages the view that neo-
conservatives have been right all along, that their proposals hearken back to the 
muscularity of Truman and the victorious world of Reagan, that they are merely 
continuing the legacy of the cold war, in which the United States transformed 
the world in its own image. The ultimate significance of neoconservatism may 
lie in its efforts to generate cultural resonance, to project an appealing narrative 
about the exceptional obligations of the United States and the “lessons of his-
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tory” in a moment of historical crisis. For many contemporary neoconservative 
writers, the ultimate success of the cold war clarified the historic mission of the 
United States, exposed those who would undermine that mission from within, 
and endorsed foreign policy priorities oriented around national defense and the 
promotion of democracy. To this way of thinking, September 11, 2001—and the 
wars that have followed—did not mark a departure from history but instead a 
grim but necessary return to familiar landscapes.
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